

# ROMANIA'S ANTI - TERRORISM CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMATION, COOPERATION, EFFECTIVENESS

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*Fighting terrorism effectively is not a new security responsibility for the security forces in Romania. Terrorism has been a menace to Romania's national security before 1989, and for years during the Communist regime, Securitate's anti-terrorist elite force's acumen had averted terrorist attacks. Yet, Cold War terrorism is different from Twenty-First Century terrorism. What changed after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and chiefly after the atrocious terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11), was the lethality and virulence of terrorists' intents and goals. Attacks in the US, Spain, Great Britain, and others urged Romania (as much as other countries) transform its overall security system to be able to fight terrorism and terrorist networks, as well as other asymmetric security threats and challenges, effectively and collaboratively. This paper reviews Romania's security system post-Cold War transformation, in pursuit of effectively averting, countering and combating terrorism.*

**Key words:** Romania's anti-terrorism, Romania's anti-terrorism cooperation, Romania's counter-terrorism reform, South Eastern Europe's anti-terrorism, South Eastern Europe's security cooperation.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Fighting terrorism effectively is not a new security responsibility for the security forces in Romania. Terrorism has been a menace to Romania's national security before 1989 [1], and for years during the Communist regime, Securitate's anti-terrorist elite force's acumen [2] had averted terrorist attacks. Yet, Cold War terrorism is different from Twenty-First Century terrorism. What changed after the fall of the Iron Curtain, and chiefly after the atrocious terrorist attacks in the United States

(US) on September 11, 2001 (9/11), was the lethality and virulence of terrorists' intents and goals. Attacks in the US, Spain, Great Britain, and others urged Romania (as much as other countries) transform its overall security system to be able to fight terrorism and terrorist networks, as well as other asymmetric security threats and challenges, effectively and collaboratively. This paper reviews Romania's security system post-Cold War transformation, in pursuit of effectively averting, countering and combating terrorism.

## **2. ROMANIA'S SECURITY INSTITUTIONS**

Romania's security forces include the armed forces (army, navy, air force) under the Ministry of Defense (MOD), police forces (gendarmerie, border, etc.) under the Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs, and six [3] intelligence agencies.

## **3. TERRORIST THREAT TO ROMANIA'S SECURITY**

Terrorism does not pose a major threat to Romania's security. Yet, Romania could become a terrorist target for a variety of reasons. First is Romania's membership (and Eastern Border) in Western collective security institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), whose countries have often become terrorist targets [4].

Second is Romania's unstable geographical surroundings (neighboring the Black Sea and the Balkans yet not far from the Caucasus and Near East) [5].

Third is the relatively high Muslim/Arabic representation in Romania, which may transform it into a hub for terrorist traffic targeting both Romania and other countries. [6]

Fourth, even without a "direct" Muslim threat, [7] Romania's friendly relations with the US, the implementation of the relocation of US military bases in Romania since 2007, and its contribution to the international anti-terrorist efforts and peace operations could, as well, make Romania a target.

## **4. REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM**

Fighting terrorism effectively calls for a modern, agile, resilient, and multi-tasking security system. To this end, especially after 9/11, Romania has channeled its countering and combating terrorism efforts toward improved terrorism prevention, counter-terrorism intervention, and consequence management capabilities. These endeavors have enveloped, inter alia, the following:

- a more robust anti-terrorism (AT) and counter-terrorism (CT) legal framework;
- effective and timely intelligence (organization, structures, personnel [including education and training], quality of analysis, and equipment);
- more agile security forces, increased information sharing, coordination and cooperation;
- improved capabilities of tracking down and weeding out any human, financial, logistic and operational involvement and/or support for terrorist activities;
- strengthened intervention capabilities (capturing terrorists, freeing hostages, reinstating order);
- better guard and protection capabilities and activities; civil emergencies, public affairs, and outreach activities.

### **4.1. STRENGTHENED ANTI-TERRORISM LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

As mentioned earlier, terrorism has long been a security concern for Romania. As a result, its AT/CT legal framework started to develop in the early 1960s, and,

as expected, has undergone some changes after 9/11, as demanded by the new security environment, Romania's determination to join the international arena in averting, countering, and combating terrorism, as well as by the requirements of NATO/EU membership. Post 9/11 legislation stipulates, besides other provisions, increased anti-terrorism powers and responsibilities for the security sector, and heightened cooperation.

A few of the most relevant AT/CT laws include: all thirteen United Nations (UN) conventions on combating terrorism; UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 (on arm proliferation and ballistic missiles), 1566 (against international terrorism) and 1373 (which set up the Anti-Terrorism Committee); Government Emergency Ordinance 141/2001; Government Emergency Ordinance 159/2001; Law 51/1991 on National Security; Romanian Penal Code; Law 14/1992 (which assigned SRI the main roles and mission with regard to terrorism prevention and countering); Law on the approval of the Government Emergency 1/1999 on the state of siege and state of emergency; Law 535/2004 on preventing and combating terrorism; Law 42/2004 on the armed forces' participation in missions outside Romanian territory; Methodology of the organization and execution of counter-terrorism intervention of 2006; Strategy of information communication on the prevention and limitation of a terrorist risk and terrorist crisis situation, of 2007; other strategies, doctrines, and rules.

#### **4.2. ROMANIA'S NATIONAL SYSTEM ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING TERRORISM**

Given the multifarious, easily adjustable, network-style nature of the terrorist groups, it became clear to the Romanian security decision makers that effectively fighting terrorism definitely not be the job of one agency, but rather, the outcome of a concerted action of a variety of security institutions. In this context, in 2001, the National Supreme Defense Council (CSAT), as the strategic coordinator of anti-terrorism strategies and policies, designated the SRI the nation's main authority (technical coordinator) in AT/CT activities. The SRI is hence authorized to conduct independently or, if needed, in cooperation and coordination with other security forces, anti-, counter- and combating terrorism operations.[8] During the same year, the SRI had established a Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (DPCT), featuring a Center of Counter-Terrorist Operational Coordination (CCOA) as a permanent technical coordinator of the interacting agencies within the National System on Preventing and Combating Terrorism (SNPCT) – an integrated structure focusing on prevention and countering terrorist threats, which was, at that time, pending becoming operational.[9] The CCOA is charged with collection, analysis, and field intervention. [10] In 2002 a National Strategy on Preventing and Combating Terrorism was adopted, which regulates the roles of all security institutions, together with a General Protocol on the organization and functioning

of the SNPCT.[11] The SNPCT became fully [12] operational in 2005 after the CSAT's adoption of a Regulation on the Organization and Functioning of the CCOA. [13] The SNPCT is tasked with preventing and combating terrorism via consultative, cooperative and collaborative efforts with additional security agencies in Romania and foreign counterparts abroad.[14]

Each SNPCT component has as well undergone transformation in view of better tackling the vagaries of the world's current security landscape. This paper will further dwell upon the transformation of the security forces' specific anti-terrorism roles, missions, and capabilities.

**Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI).** As previously stated, AT/CT transformation after 9/11 has started with SRI's becoming the anti-terrorism leader in the country. Its Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism (DPCT) is the coordinator of Romania's domestic AT/CT efforts, charged with the integrated planning, organization, implementation and execution of all activities involving the prevention, detection, and annihilation of terrorist activities and actions in the country. [15] Its intelligence component is charged with collection and analysis on all national security risks, challenges and threats, including terrorism. [16] DGPCT's operational

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component, the AT Brigade (BA), created on the ruins of Securitate's former Special Unit for Fighting Terrorism (USLA), ensures the AT protection of Romanian and foreign dignitaries, and conducts AT/CT operations in venues under attack or seized by terrorists, being capable to deploy and execute ground, air, and maritime missions everywhere in Romania within two-and-a-half hours.[17]

**Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE):** The SIE ensures the collection, assessment, and dissemination of relevant threat development (including terrorism) outside Romania's territory, as well as field intervention. [18] It established an

elite intervention unit, trained in the U.S. at Delta bases, and in Great Britain at SAS facilities, which specializes in possible interventions outside Romanian territory, including freeing hostages and ensuring the guard and protection of embassies abroad. [19] After 9/11, the SIE also underwent a transformation and reorganization process, following the model of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

**Guard and Protection Service (SPP):** The SPP is Romania's agency charged with the guarding and protection of the life and personal integrity of the President, as well as other Romanian and foreign diplomats and leaders. It has collection, analysis,

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and field intervention responsibilities and capabilities. Its Anti-Terrorist Intervention Section (SIAT) is charged with the prevention and countering of terrorist risks, challenges, and attacks aimed at the persons/facilities the SPP is safeguarding. [20]

**Ministry of Defense:** Romania's Armed Forces are integral part of the SNTP; since the end of the Cold War and especially after the terrorist attacks in the US and Europe, its anti-terrorist units have embarked upon a systematic transformation, to adjust to the new security threats effectively, and become more interoperable with NATO/EU similar structures. The Armed Forces' AT/CT contribution involves intelligence, operational, and combat actions (and adjacent support).

First, MOD's General Directorate for Defense Intelligence (DGIA) ensures the military intelligence: the collection, processing, assessment, analysis, storing and utilization of information and data on all security risks, challenges, and threats (military and non-military, domestic and international), which impact Romania's security from the perspective of national defense; counterintelligence activities; the protection of national, NATO and EU classified information within the MOD; and combat and field interventions and operations. [21] It contributes with Liaison Officers (HUMINT) and analysis to the various UN, NATO or EU operations. [22] The DGIA makes Romania one of the few NATO members to have an Integrated Multisource Collection Capability (IMCC), which receives information from theaters of operation as well as from operational and strategic

sources, and uses HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT.[23] These capabilities have also been used for preventing and combating maritime terrorism at the Black Sea. [24] The DGIA has recently developed a functional cyberintelligence (CYBERINT) structure, charged with the surveillance and collection from cyberspace, aimed to prevent and stop any malicious, hostile and deceptive cyberthreats or cyberattacks to Romania's security.[25] Its overall "INT" capabilities, coupled with the recently adopted system of communications monitoring through satellite (MONSAT) [26] make the DGIA an effective intelligence with regard to asymmetrical threats, including terrorism.

Second, various MOD components have developed modern, NATO interoperable AT/CT intervention capabilities and task forces. The DGIA has a Rapid Intervention Detachment (DIR), charged with: guarding and protection of MOD facilities, assets, leaders, and personnel, both in Romania and abroad (including those in the theaters of operations); technical AT control and CT actions and intervention (in cooperation with its SNPCT counterparts); and guarding and protection of all foreign military facilities and personnel operating on the Romanian territory. [27] Under DGIA also functions, since 2011, the Special Operation Force (SOF) Battalion, "Vulturii" for out-of-area operations under NATO or Multinational Forces command. [28] The SOF have a land component (e.g. the 1st SF Battalion and disparate assets [reconnaissance, paratroopers, infantry, mountain troops, NBC, engineers, communications, psychological operations, and

logistical support]), a supporting air component (e.g. fighters, bombers, transportation aircraft etc.), as well as a supporting naval component (e.g. SEAL-type elements, and transportation boats).[29] Its combating terrorism operations encompass hostage rescue, recovery or capture of sensitive material, and the targeting of terrorist organization infrastructure.[30] The Navy has two NATO certified SEALs Detachments, whose main AT/CT duties involve defending anchoring places and deep water routes, mine detection and demining, defending oil drilling platforms, and preventing underwater diversions.[31] The DNFOS conduct sea, air and land missions, any time and in any place, and comprise combat incursion divers and command officers, and is part of the Special Operations Force Naval Group (GNFOS). [32] They are multi-tasking, in that, besides divers, they are paratroopers, mountain troops, scouts, and snipers. [33] The Marines have the Infantry Battalion, an intervention unit that conducts commando operations, reconnaissance actions, and other. [34]

Third, additional AT/CT efforts reside in the following: Air Force support to CT intervention (e.g. personnel transportation to the immediate proximity of the risk region, combat support, evacuation, etc.); Navy contribution with data and information, transportation to the target, and in certain circumstances, combat support; and, Army contribution with infantry battalions (e.g. paratroopers, mountaineers), military police, NBC, engineers, EOD, as well as logistic and medical support. [35]

**Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs:** The MIRA has developed intelligence capabilities and AT/CT intervention teams. The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Security (DGIPI) is MIRA's intelligence unit which does collection and analysis on terrorist threats and organized crime. [36] Gendarmerie has a Special Intervention Brigade, "Vlad Tepes", charged with countering serious and violent street crimes and terrorist activities (hostage rescuing, counter-terrorist operations, sensitive objectives protection, etc.).[37] The Brigade was named after the notorious king Vlad Tepes, whose reign was crime-free, due to the strong hand of his rule. "Vlad Tepes" features, among others, the Special Protection and Intervention Group "Acvila", which handles protection of dignitaries protection (especially those who received death threats), special police intervention (against individual or organized criminals), and AT/CT intervention (in cooperation with other CT structures). [38] The Border Police has the Security Rapid Intervention Force (SASI) that fights organized crime and terrorism at the border area. [39]

**Special Telecommunications Service (STS):** The STS organizes and coordinates the lawful telecommunications activities for Romania's public authorities and other users. The institution performs SIGINT functions. With regard to combating terrorism, STS implemented the European emergency call number 1-1-2 in Romania. [40]

### **4.3. COMBATING TERRORISM IS “EVERYONE’S BUSINESS”**

#### **4.3.1. DOMESTIC EFFORTS**

The CSAT is the main coordinator of Romania’s security activity. In line with CSAT’s directives, policies, and protocols, and in compliance with a series of interagency cooperation and coordination rules, laws and regulations, all components of the SNPCT have established coordination and cooperation agreements among themselves, with other security institutions, and with international counterparts. In addition, they have also established avenues of communication, information and collaboration with representatives of civil society. All these have paved the way toward information and intelligence sharing, common education and training, mutual support (with regard to personnel, education and training), and joint field and combat operations.

The CSAT issued a cooperation protocol among all security institutions to enable information and intelligence sharing. [41] The intelligence agencies have additional specific protocols on sharing, protection of classified information, SIGINT, and monitoring satellite communications. [42] Anti-terrorist brigades and intervention units of the anti-terrorist system are training together, [43] exchange personnel [44], and act together [45] under the SRI’s coordination.

Since “security is everyone’s business”, the security organizations (including intelligence) have also established communications and information avenues with the civilian decision makers (executive and legislative members), civil society

(NGOs, media, think tanks, and academia representatives), and even directly with the population (schools, high schools, and even kindergartens), aiming, on the one hand, at informing the population on the threats and challenges posed by terrorism to Romania’s security, explaining their capabilities to protect the citizens, and, on the other hand, encouraging the citizens to alert the security agencies on potential terrorist threats. Round tables, seminars, meetings, visits to education facilities are but a few efforts in this context, undertaken by the intelligence agencies (and even their anti-terrorist intervention units). [46] These endeavors seem to have served their purposes; not only have the citizens become more aware of the terrorist threats to Romania’s national, regional and international security, but they have also become more willing to notify the security institutions on threats. As former SIE director Ioan Talpes noted, much of the information that contributed to averting and combating terrorist threats in Romania came from the populace. [47]

#### **4.3.2. INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND COOPERATION**

Romania has also been an active supporter of the global efforts aimed to deny terrorists and terrorist groups the oxygen of evil doing. To this end, immediately after 9/11, Romania fully supported NATO’s decision on the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, allowed U.S. aircraft to utilize its airspace for combat actions in Afghanistan, contributed military troops, police and intelligence personnel for NATO’s missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan,



joined the Coalition of the willing in Iraq, and dynamically engaged in the myriad global, regional and subregional collaborative AT/CT enterprises. [48]

Within the UN, NATO, EU, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), etc., as well as within various international networks of countering terrorist financing (e.g. Egmont Group), Romania's security agencies have been active participants and positive forces in supporting security and security cooperation.[49] In South Eastern Europe (SEE), Romania has been participating in a variety of either bilateral or subregional collective security initiatives and institutions, including the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center for Combating Trans Border Crime, European Network and Information Security Agency (ENSIA), European Police Office (EUROPOL), International Bomb Data Center, Balkan Communication Network, numerous Black Sea cooperative initiatives, the Brdo Process, the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Center (RACVIAC), and others.[50]

As intelligence agencies are first in line of AT/CT defense, and from the premise of 'fighting networks with networks', Romania's intelligence agencies have established specific intelligence sharing and exchange mechanisms with foreign partners, on information sharing, mutual support (including financial, acquisitions and procurement), visits, and joint training.[51] SIE, SRI and SPP intervention teams, either based on bilateral agreements, or under the umbrella of the previously-mentioned

collective security organizations, have participated in numerous common training programs and exercises with U.S., French, and U.K. counterparts. DIR has been actively participating in all NATO and non-NATO anti-terrorist exercises organized by the Romanian Armed Forces, joint exercises with the 1st Battalion/10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, or with Bulgarian and Serbian counterparts (on border and counter-terrorism issues).[52]

With regard to the armed forces AT/CT cooperation, besides the Romania's military participation in NATO exercises, relevant, too, are the naval operations "NATO Active Endeavour" and "Black Sea Harmony", which brought together various South Eastern European countries, and the effective counter-terrorism simulations within the South Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM). [53]

On the same note, within the framework of EUROPOL, besides cooperation with EU members, Romania's law enforcement agencies cooperate and share information with counterparts from various countries and organizations, including countries from SEE countries that are not members of the EU (e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey).[54] Likewise, within the SECI Center's Anti-Terrorism Task Force Romania's law enforcement agencies have been cooperating with SEE counterparts, through regular meetings, as well as information and experience exchange and sharing.[55] It is also worth mentioning Romania's MIRA AT/CT brigades joint training

and exchange of expertise with international counterparts, especially from Germany.

#### **4.4. ANALYSIS OF ROMANIA'S ANTI-TERRORISM EFFECTIVENESS: CHALLENGES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

Romania has implemented dramatic changes in its security system since the end of Communism and accession to NATO and the EU to better fight current security threats, including terrorism. Yet, these changes did not happen overnight; they involved a lot of work, efforts, and willingness, and had to face a series of challenges.

First is the challenge of time: it takes time to build professionalism and expertise. With regard to intelligence, for example, the purge of former Securitate personnel (mainly those involved in abuses and transgressions during the communist regime) from the post-communist agencies left a vacuum of expertise in the new structures. Recruiting, educating and training new collection agents, analysts and even intervention personnel has been an onerous process.[56] In the same context, since expertise requires time to build, some of the AT/CT units have become operational and interoperable after a few years since establishment, while others are yet to be fully operational.

Second, parts of the legal framework on security are obsolete, enacted when Romania was not a member of any regional collective security organization, and was surrounded by a different geopolitical context, in which the terrorist threat was not as high as now; these have

also obstructed the modernization of some security agencies, including AT/CT transformation.[57]

Third, resources and resource allocation are essential in achieving effectiveness. [58] Some special intervention units are still in need of up-to-date equipment and assets. For example, parts of the deep sea diving techniques within the Military Divers Center where DNFOs and EOD detachments are trained is thirty years old and needed to be replaced a while ago; due to limited resources, upgrading of the technique has been incremental.[59]

Fourth, and most important, even with a rather solid legal framework for cooperation, developing security cooperation (including in the field of anti-terrorism) in Romania has been cumbersome, due to agencies' rigidified bureaucratic environment (which has delayed and/or hindered information sharing and collaboration), too many intelligence agencies (which fueled dishonest competition and rivalry among agencies, because of redundancy and overlapping roles and missions), politicization, and political infighting. [60] Security and intelligence cooperation/collaboration is still an issue, in that some agencies still prefer bilateral approaches, while others are still reluctant to share information, especially in a multilateral format, unless a crisis comes up.[61]

Fifth, Cooperation at the international level was also difficult at first; Romania remained isolated from the West, as many NATO and Western counterparts were reluctant to share information with Romanian intelligence personnel who had previously worked for the Securitate and remained employed by the

agencies after the regime change in December 1989.[62] In addition, AT/CT cooperation among the countries of South Eastern Europe (including Romania) has been hampered by a series of discrepancies in terms of country development, institution-building, and European and Euro-Atlantic integration; hence different paces of security sector reform (SSR) and transformation, different counter-terrorism and organized crime legislation, resources, capabilities, methods, and equipment.[63]

Sixth, and related to the previous point, problematic too, could be the existence of too many intervention units, which may, at a minimum, become a bureaucratic burden, due to potential overlapping and duplication of responsibilities and missions.

Seventh, the security institutions, in particular intelligence agencies, have been the subjects of various media scandals due to negligence (e.g. avoiding to monitor a Romanian businessman of Syrian origin, charged with terrorism, who later disappeared), malfeasance (using terrorism prevention to wiretap innocent people), leak of classified information (e.g. information involving AT/CT issues), and politicization; these practices have affected the overall security reform process, which also impacted the AT/CT transformation.[64]

In time, Romania's security agencies have been able to overcome these challenges and, through elaborated transformation endeavors in terms of personnel, structure, organization, resources, and acquisitions, become more effective and more network-like, both internally and abroad. Romania's counter-terrorism forces have transformed

their AT/CT collectors and analysts, revamped and strengthened the interoperability of their intervention and combat units (especially as a result of NATO/EU membership), and deployed professional teams in the theaters, capable to effectively predict, avert, and counter concrete security risk factors and crises.[65]

At the domestic level stand out the numerous AT/CT cases of effectiveness [66], a direct outcome of the robust security transformation, on the one hand, and of improved collaborative [67] actions of the intelligence agencies, police, and other security organizations, seconded by Romania's willingness to contribute to the international conjugated efforts to stave off terrorism.[68] At the international level (especially in Iraq and Afghanistan), stand out Romania's effective HUMINT, IMINT and GEOINT capabilities within hostile operational environments.[69] Romania's professionalism and expertise has led to the establishment in Romania (as a NATO decision) of a NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence (COE), which ensures HUMINT training, participates in NATO documents development, and other issues related to NATO standardization process.[70] In addition, SPP officers have proved professionalism when conduction guard and protection missions of various UN officials in Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, which may lead to the creation of a center of excellence (both training and research and development) in Romania, in support of UN activities.[71]

On the other hand, to overcome challenges to the democratization of the security forces (e.g. intelligence),

and prevent the use of “terrorism prevention” as a pretext for abuses, the Romanian authorities, whether pressured by the civil society and international partners, or following their own will to change, have institutionalized processes to support both the effectiveness of the security agencies, as well transparency and democratic control. [72]

## **5. CONCLUSIONS**

Terrorism is omnipresent and no country (Romania included) is exempt from its threats and challenges; as former SRI Director Radu Timofte once stated, “Al-Qaeda does not wear a 'visitor' badge when present in one country or another”. [73] Events like 9/11 were not isolated, one-time, singular actions, but part of a progressive chain of vitriolic terrorist attacks (Madrid, London, Istanbul, Sharm el Sheikh, Mumbai, Bombay, and others). Romania has been a vehement opponent of terrorism and terrorist attacks, as well as an active participant in the international endeavors to curb it.

Since the regime change in 1989, and especially after the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, Romania has embarked upon a comprehensive reform and transformation process aimed on the one hand at the democratization of its security forces, and, on the other hand, at their effectiveness in fighting the post-Cold War security threats and challenges, including terrorism. In time and after having totally or partially overcome a number of challenges, Romania's security forces are now full and effective contributors to the international fight against terrorism, at national and international levels, as follows: capabilities of

collection, analysis, dissemination of relevant and timely information to the national and international decision makers; assets and capabilities of effective AT/CT intervention; team players and professionals in the CT coalitions within various theaters of operations. Their professionalism and effectiveness in the joint fight of terrorism has been repeatedly recognized by foreign counterparts. [74] Based on the principle of indivisible and cooperative security, Romania's security forces (with intelligence in the first line) will continue their involvement in the international and regional efforts to stop terrorism.

In South Eastern Europe, Romania is well linked with other SEE countries (which share similar security concerns and challenges) in the fight against terrorism, through several cooperative mechanisms, ranging from bilateral agreements and subregional arrangements, to regional organizations and alliances. The Romanian security forces' profuse connection with SEE countries involves, on the other hand, habitual meetings, experience and information sharing avenues, common education, training, and exercises on anti-counter- and combating terrorism issues, and, on the other hand, joint AT/CT interventions and missions. Effective AT/CT responses in SEE are due, besides others, to the Romanian security forces' contribution, too.

Admittedly, challenges have tested and will keep testing South Eastern Europe's security cooperation. Yet, despite any present or future challenges, SEE's fight against terrorism will continue to benefit from Romania's important geostrategic position, good relations



with its neighbors and other regional partners, and reliable AT/CT capabilities. Romania's security forces will strengthen their AT/CT contribution to NATO, EU (EUROPOL), and the SECI Center, will maintain and improve bilateral and trilateral cooperation and information sharing with those SEE countries that are not (yet) NATO/EU members (while supporting and assisting the membership efforts of SEE NATO/EU aspirant countries), and will deepen cooperation at the Black Sea.

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[9] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, *Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy*. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660. The system comprises the following agencies: CSAT; all security forces; Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Economy and Commerce; Ministry of Agriculture, Forrest and Rural Development; Ministry of Environment and Water Management; Ministry of Transport, Building and Tourism; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Communication and Information; Ministry of Technology; Ministry of Public Finance; Ministry of European Integration; Ministry of Justice; Romania's National Bank; National Agency for Exports Control; National Office for Preventing and Countering Money Laundering; National Commission for the Control of Nuclear Activities. *Profil*, no. 8, August 2005, pp. 1-36, [www.sri.ro](http://www.sri.ro), pp. 1-36 (February 02, 2007).

[10] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, *Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy*. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[11] <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>; 2008, "Activitatea Națională de Prevenire și Combatere a Terorismului", *Intelligence*, no. 11, May, [www.sri.ro](http://www.sri.ro); "24 Decembrie. Ziua Luptătorului Antiterorist", *Intelligence*, no. 14, December 2008 - February 2009, pp. 43-45, [www.sri.ro](http://www.sri.ro), (November 10, 2009).

[12] The System had been partially operational since 2004, with the enactment of Law 535/2004 that stipulates the roles and institutions in the SNPCT. <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>; <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>;

[13] The System had been partially operational since 2004, with the enactment

of Law 535/2004 that stipulates the roles and institutions in the SNPCT. <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>; <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>

[14] <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>; "Activitatea Națională de Prevenire și Combatere a Terorismului", *Intelligence*, no. 11, May 2008, [www.sri.ro](http://www.sri.ro), (November 10, 2009).

[15] For details on the wide spectrum of roles and missions of the System, see: <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>; "Activitatea Națională de Prevenire și Combatere a Terorismului", *Intelligence*, no. 11, May 2008, [www.sri.ro](http://www.sri.ro), (November 10, 2009).

[16] Gheorghe Vaduva, *Terorismul contemporan – factor de risc la adresa securității și apărării naționale, în condițiile statutului României de membru NATO*. Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, 2005, pp. 1-47.

[17] <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>, (December 17, 2009).

[18] <http://www.sri.ro/categorii/23/antiterorism--contraterorism.html>, (December 17, 2009); also, see Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, *Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy*. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[19] <http://www.dci.ro/En/Arhiva/interviu3.html>, (December, 15, 2009).

[20] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, *Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy*. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[21] "Trupe Speciale la Brasov", *Ziua*, <http://stiri.kappa.ro/actualitate/03-10-2006/trupe-speciale-la-brasov-107161.html>; <http://www.spp.ro/misiuni.htm>; <http://www.spp.ro/orgchart.htm>, (December 20, 2009).

[22] Gheorghe Savu,  *Direcția Generală de Informații a Apărării - prezent și perspective*. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16.

[23] DGIA has a HUMINT battalion. "Batalionul HUMINT la 5 ani de la infiintare", <http://www.stirilocale.ro/>

Batalionul\_Humint\_la\_5\_anide\_la\_infintare\_IDN9878.html, (December 21, 2009). Also, on analysis, see Gheorghe Rotaru, Importanța înființării Direcției generale de informații a apărării în cadrul procesului de transformare a armatei române. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 17-21.

[24] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[25] Gheorghe Rotaru, Importanța înființării direcției generale de informații a apărării în cadrul procesului de transformare a armatei române. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 17-21.

[26] Ilie Botos, Direcția generală de informații a apărării, principala capabilitate a Ministerului Apărării Naționale în prevenirea și combaterea amenințărilor asimetrice. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 35-40.

[27] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[28] Doru Dragomir, Hackerii Armatei. *Ziua*, January 23, 2009; Gheorghe Savu, Direcția Generală de Informații a Apărării - prezent și perspective. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16; Gheorghe Rotaru, Importanța înființării Direcției generale de informații a apărării în cadrul procesului de transformare a armatei române. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 17-21.

[29] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660. The Special Operations were up until 2011 under the command of the General Staff.

[30] Dan Cucu, Romanian Special Forces: Identifying Appropriate Missions and Organizational Structure, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004, pp. 1-125.

[31] Claudiu O. Dobocan, Decisions Integration: A Critical Necessity for Special Operations. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004, pp. 1-161.

[32] The Detachments are: Detachment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

Divers, and, the Special Operation Force Naval Detachment Alpha 1 (DNFOS 1). Marius Dumitru Craciun, Operații speciale contrateroriste în Marea Neagră – posibile obiective, proceduri și pachete de forțe necesar', în Constantin Mostoflei, Strategii de apărare și securitate la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO și UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, 2006, pp. 159-178; Mihnea Petru Parvu, Marinarii din Adancuri. *Romania Libera: Editia Online*, September 29, 2006; Simona Rus, Modernizarea Grupelor de Scafandri EOD. *Gandirea Militara Romaneasca*, May-June, 2007, pp. 101-107.

[33] <http://www.navy.ro/media/rmr/rmr119.pdf>, (December 20, 2009); Marina Romana, Special Edition, no. 2 (132) 2009; Darius Martinescu, SEAL-ul Romanesc se Antreneaza in Tacere. *Romania Libera*, October 13, 2008; Simona Rus, Modernizarea Grupelor de Scafandri EOD. *Gandirea Militara Romaneasca*, May-June, 2007, pp. 101-107; Mihnea Petru Parvu, Marinarii din Adancuri. *Romania Libera: Editia Online*, September 29, 2006.

[34] Discussion with Romanian MOD officers.

[35] *Observatorul Militar*, no. 19 (May 20-26, 2009); *Revista Marina*, no. 5 (127) 2008, *Marina Romana*, Special Edition, no. 2 (132) 2009

[36] Vasile Bogdan, Grupul de scafandri de incursiune - structură destinată intervenției antiteroriste /contrateroriste în zona mării negre in Constantin Mostoflei, Strategii de apărare și securitate la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO și UE, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, 2006, pp. 159-178.

[37] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[38] "Bataie cu jandarmii in Piata Charles de Gaulle", *Ziua Online*, March 3, 2008, <http://www.ziua.net/news.php?data=2008-03-03&id=4119>, (December 19, 2009).

[39] <http://romanianspecialforces.com/acvila.html>; "Acvila" va functiona in cadrul Brigazii Speciale de Interventie a Jandarmeriei, March 16, 2009, <http://>

[www.frontnews.ro/social-si-economic/eveniment/luptatorii-acvila-ameninta-cu-demisia-o-unitate-de-elita-nu-poate-lucra-cu-birocratie-26878](http://www.frontnews.ro/social-si-economic/eveniment/luptatorii-acvila-ameninta-cu-demisia-o-unitate-de-elita-nu-poate-lucra-cu-birocratie-26878); "Luptatorii "Acvila" ameninta cu demisia: O unitate de elita nu poate lucra cu birocratie", <http://www.frontnews.ro/social-si-economic/eveniment/luptatorii-acvila-ameninta-cu-demisia-o-unitate-de-elita-nu-poate-lucra-cu-birocratie-26878>; "Trupe Speciale la Brasov", Ziua, <http://stiri.kappa.ro/actualitate/03-10-2006/trupe-speciale-la-brasov-107161.html>, (December 20, 2009).

[40] <http://torun.indymedia.org/4564>; <http://www.igpr.ro/siias.htm> (December 20, 2009).

[41] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[42] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[43] Gheorghe Savu, Direcția Generală de Informații a Apărării - prezent și perspective. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16.

[44] MIRA, SRI, SPP have common CT exercises. They also invite other Romanian counterparts and foreign guests; in 2006 they invited FBI agents operating in Romania, Israel military attaché in Romania, DIICOT personnel etc. "Trupe Speciale la Brasov", Ziua, <http://stiri.kappa.ro/actualitate/03-10-2006/trupe-speciale-la-brasov-107161.html>; Likewise, AT/CT intervention teams of SRI, MOD, MIRA have specific common naval AT/CT training. <http://www.cronicaromana.ro/stiri-58.html>, (December 20, 2009)

[45] SRI DA assists SPP with AT protection of officials, whenever they face terrorist threats. Some SPP personnel come from the Marines' Infantry Battalion. Radu Tudor, Romania's Anti-terrorist Brigade extends co-operation in fight against terror, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 01, 2002;

Darius Martinescu, SEAL-ul Romanesc se Antreneaza in Tacere. *Romania Libera*, October 13, 2008.

[46] With regard to AT intervention, for example, when MOD targets are involved, the main units operating are DIR, SOF "Vulturii" Battalion, and (GNFOS), but only in cooperation with the SRI and, if needed, with other security forces. If the target is a vessel, hijacked by terrorists within the territorial waters, intervention is ensured by SRI' unit and MOD, under SRI's command, while if the target is outside territorial waters, MOD forces could intervene, but only with CSAT approval. The MOD, MIRA and SRI have also cooperated in ensuring protection and guard activities for rotation the foreign troop in the Balkans theaters. For more information, see: Vasile Bogdan, Grupul de scafandri de incursiune - structură destinată intervenției antiteroriste /contrateroriste în zona Mării Negre, in Constantin Mostoflei, *Strategii de apărare și securitate la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO și UE*, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, 2006, pp. 159-178; Marius Dumitru Crăciun, Operații speciale contrateroriste în Marea Neagră – posibile obiective, proceduri și pachete de forțe necesar", in Constantin Mostoflei, *Strategii de apărare și securitate la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO și UE*, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, 2006, pp. 159-178; Gheorghe Savu, Direcția Generală de Informații a Apărării - prezent și perspective. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16; Doru Dragomir, Hackerii Armatei. Ziua, January 23, 2008; Gheorghe Rotaru, Importanța înființării direcției generale de informații a apărării în cadrul procesului de transformare a armatei române. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 17-21.

[47] Relevant is the campaign "Terrorism ... Near Us" of the SRI (which also involves its AT Brigade). MIRA's intervention units also go to kindergartens and schools to explain their capabilities (Source: discussion with Romanian police officers, 2009). Also, see Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[48] Marius Diac, În ultimii doi ani, în România au fost preîntâmpinate patru atentate teroriste. *Adevărul*, January 13, 2004.



[49] Apart from combat troops, Romania's contribution encompasses AT/CT and intelligence units, as follows: in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, with National Intelligence Cells (RONIC), police personnel and divers of the Marines' Infantry Battalion; in Afghanistan, with a Detachment of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and SOF; and in Iraq, with a Military Intelligence Detachment. See: Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585; Mihai Diac, Misiune "Vulturii" zboară spre est. *Armata Română* a trimis în Afganistan un nou detașament de forțe speciale. *Gandul*, October 9, 2007.

[50] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[51] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime: South Eastern Europe Collective Approaches. *Bilten Slovenske Vojske*, 10/Št. 3, September, 2008, pp. 36-58.

[52] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[53] Emil Olaru, Aspecte din activitatea detașamentului de intervenție rapidă, *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 50-52; Gheorghe

Savu, Direcția Generală de Informații a Apărării - prezent și perspective. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16.

[54] Marius Dumitru Craciun, Operații speciale contrateroriste în Marea Neagră – posibile obiective, proceduri și pachete de forțe necesare, in Constantin Mostoflei, *Strategii de apărare și securitate la frontiera răsăriteană a NATO și UE*, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, 2006, pp. 159-178; Iztok Prezelj, Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in South Eastern Europe: Analysis of an Example of SEDM Regional Initiative. *Bilten Slovenske Vojske*, 10/Št. 3, September, 2008, pp. 58-82.

[55] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime: South Eastern Europe Collective Approaches. *Bilten Slovenske Vojske*, 10/Št. 3, September, 2008, pp. 36-58.

[56] [http://www.secicenter.org/p263/Anti\\_Terrorism\\_Task\\_Force](http://www.secicenter.org/p263/Anti_Terrorism_Task_Force), (January 11, 2010).

[57] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Reconciling Intelligence Effectiveness and Transparency: The Case of Romania. *Strategic Insights*, vol. IV, issue 3, May, 2007; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 629-660.

[58] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post-Communist Romania, *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, vol. 22, issue 4, December, 2009, pp. 667-698.

[59] Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Toward a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations. *Democratization*, vol. 15, no. 5, December, 2008, pp. 909-929.

[60] Darius Martinescu, SEAL-ul Romanesc se Antreneaza in Tacere. *Romania Libera*, October 13, 2008.

[61] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[62] Discussions with intelligence, military and police personnel.

[63] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[64] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[65] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Reconciling Intelligence Effectiveness and Transparency: The Case of Romania. *Strategic Insights*, vol. IV, issue 3, May, 2007; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post-Communist Romania, *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, vol. 22, issue 4, December, 2009, pp. 667-698.

[66] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[67] Cases solved include: in 2005, annihilation of an Islamic radical group of five al-Qaeda members, which had recruited new followers in Romania and tried to recruit foreign citizens of the Muslim religion; in 2006, the apprehension of a Jordanian suspected of allegiance to the Muslim Brothers group; in 2006, arresting in Timisoara a bomb plot suspect suspected of affiliation to several terrorist organizations and planning to stage a terror attack in response to the close U.S.–Romania relationship “24 Decembrie. Ziua Luptatorului Antiterorist”, *Intelligence*, no. 14, December 2008 – February 2009, pp. 43-45, [www.sri.ro](http://www.sri.ro), (November 10, 2009).

[68] Notable are the expedite information and intelligence sharing via a common data based used by all security institutions, and the CSAT-created National Intelligence Community (CNI) set up to foster interagency cooperation and coordination.

[69] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Reconciling Intelligence Effectiveness and Transparency: The Case of Romania. *Strategic Insights*, vol. IV, issue 3, May, 2007; Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[70] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.

[71] Sergiu Medar, Cooperarea dintre structurile de informații ale armatei române și serviciile străine de informații. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 22-26; Emil Olaru, Aspecte din activitatea detașamentului de intervenție rapidă, *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 50-52; Gheorghe Savu, Direcția Generală de Informații a Apărării - prezent și perspective. *Infosfera*, no. 3, 2009, pp. 13-16.

[72] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania. *Intelligence and National Security*, no. 24, issue 4, August, 2009, pp. 574-585.

[73] Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Toward a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations. *Democratization*, vol. 15, no. 5, December, 2008, pp. 909-929; Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness, in Loch K. Johnson ed., *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 1-912.

[74] “Radu Timofte: “Al-Qaeda nu poarta ecuson de “vizitator””, [http://www.phg.ro/stire.php?id=4608&cat\\_id=10](http://www.phg.ro/stire.php?id=4608&cat_id=10), (December 20, 2009).

[75] Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, December, vol. 20, no. 4, 2007, pp. 629-660.